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Introduction 
If you are like the vast majority of people, you eat, wear, and otherwise use 
products made from or by non-human animals (hereafter: animals). Like most 
aspects of human life, these actions have an ethical dimension: we can ask 
what principles ought to guide our interactions with animals, and what 
implications those principles have for our use of animal products. Ethical 
vegans accept a radical view of our relations to animals: they claim that it is 
(at least ordinarily) wrong to eat or otherwise use animal products.  
Because this view demands a radical change in our lifestyles, it may 
initially seem implausible, or even absurd. In this paper, I show that this 
dismissive attitude is unwarranted. I do this by sketching a clear and 
compelling case for a version of the vegan view. To be precise, I defend:  
 
Modest Ethical Veganism It is typically wrong to use animal products  
 
This thesis is modest in two respects. First, some vegans might claim that it is 
wrong to use products made from or by any member of the animal kingdom. 
However, by animal products, I mean only those products made from or by 
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mammals, and the birds that are familiar sources of meat (chickens, turkeys, 
ducks, etc.).  
 (I very briefly discuss how far my argument can be extended to other species 
of animals in the final section of the paper.) Second, unlike the boldest forms 
of ethical veganism, my thesis claims only that it is typically wrong to use 
animal products, not that it is always wrong. (Unless explicitly noted, I use 
“veganism” in what follows to refer to this modest form of the view.)    
 One might argue for veganism in many ways.1 For example, one might 
argue that one should become a vegan because it is good for your health, or 
because of the bad environmental effects of animal agriculture. I will discuss 
these ideas very briefly in §§3 and 4, but they are not central to my argument. 
Instead, I focus on spelling out some of the ethical consequences of the fact 
that the industry that provides us with animal products systematically inflicts 
mind-boggling quantities of suffering and death on billions of animals each 
year. I develop my argument in three stages. I first argue that the wrongness 
of inflicting suffering can be partially explained by what it is like to suffer. I 
                                                     
1 Many philosophers defend views related to veganism within various systematic ethical 
frameworks. For utilitarianism see (Singer 1980), for broadly Rawlsian and Scanlonian 
contractualist approaches, see respectively (Rowlands 2002, Ch. 3) and (Talbert 2006), for a 
‘rights’ view see (Regan 2004), for a Kantian approach see (Korsgaard 2004), and for virtue 
theory see (Hursthouse 2006). If you find one of these ethical frameworks especially 
compelling, you should consider reading the relevant paper from this group. My argument 
does not presuppose such a systematic framework; two important arguments for 
vegetarianism that share this feature are (Rachels 1997) and (DeGrazia 2009); this paper is 
especially indebted to these last papers.   
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argue on this basis that it is typically wrong to make animals suffer (§1). I then 
argue that the wrongness of killing can be partially explained by the fact that 
killing typically deprives the victim of a valuable future.  I argue on this basis 
that it is typically wrong to kill animals (§2). Together with facts about the 
lives of animals raised for our use, these principles entail that the institutions 
responsible for providing most of our animal products act wrongfully on a 
massive scale. I argue that it is typically wrong to use such animal products 
because doing so constitutes a wrongful form of complicity with these 
institutions (§3). I conclude by discussing some of the implications and 
limitations of the view that follows from my argument (§4). 
Before proceeding to my argument, let me clarify the nature of ethical 
principles, as I will be discussing them in this paper. Consider a familiar 
principle: it is wrong to break your promises. First, this principle states a 
typically sufficient (but not necessary) condition for wrongness. In this case: 
if an act breaks a promise, then it is typically wrong. This is compatible with 
there being many wrong acts that do not involve promise-breaking. Second, 
ethical principles are typically defeasible. There are two ways ordinary 
principles can be defeated. First, the principle can be outweighed in a given 
context, by important competing ethical considerations. For example, if I need 
to break my promise to meet you for lunch in order to save a life, it would not 
be wrong to do that. Second, some ethical principles can be undercut: ordinary 
conditions for their holding can be absent. For example, if I only promised you 
that I would paint a certain bicycle because you led me to falsely believe it was 
yours, I might have no reason to keep my promise once I find out that you 
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stole the bicycle. I will explicitly signal that the principles I defend may be 
defeasible in these ways by including the word ‘typically’ in their statement.  
 
1.  The wrongness of making animals suffer 
I begin my central argument for veganism in this section, by considering the 
ethical significance of animal suffering. After briefly explaining how I 
understand animal suffering, I argue that reflection on why it is bad to suffer 
and wrong to inflict suffering supports the conclusion that it is typically wrong 
to make animals suffer.  
  There are many phenomena that might be grouped together under 
the heading ‘suffering,’ and humans are surely capable of suffering in ways 
that animals cannot. However, I take it to be clear that animals can suffer in 
ethically important ways.2 Consider two examples of what I have in mind by 
‘suffering.’ The first is intense physical pain, such as a piglet experiences when 
he is castrated without anesthetic. The second is intense distress, such as a 
cow or a sow experiences when she is separated from her young far earlier 
than is natural. I take it be clear that animal suffering is ethically significant. 
But it may be useful to consider a vivid case to illustrate that significance. 
Suppose that I caught a stray dog, took him home, and then repeatedly applied 
electric shocks to his genitals: shocks so intense that they were just short of 
                                                     
2 Here I set aside important debates. Should pain be distinguished from suffering? Does the 
latter require capacities that the former lacks? Is only the latter ethically significant? I take 
the best work on animal pain and suffering to strongly support the assumption made in the 
text. See (Allen 2004) and (Akhtar 2011, 495-501) for helpful discussion.  
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life-threatening. My shocking the dog in this way would be very wrong. 
(Notice that, this claim too is only true holding ordinary assumptions fixed. If 
shocking the dog were for some reason necessary to prevent hundreds of 
human deaths, I should shock the dog.)  
I seek a plausible and general explanation for why it would be wrong 
to shock the dog. To begin the search, consider the possibility of accidentally 
smashing one of your fingers with a hammer. There are many sorts of reasons 
to avoid such an outcome: both the pain and the injury would be distracting 
and would disrupt your ability to pursue your goals; you might be ridiculed 
for your clumsiness; etc. These reasons do not compete with each other. 
Rather, each of them is typically a sufficient explanation of why you should 
avoid smashing your finger. Another plausible typically sufficient explanation 
of why you should avoid smashing your finger is simply that experiencing the 
intense throbbing pain of one’s injured finger is – just by itself – bad.3  
Think next about why it is wrong to inflict suffering on another person. 
Again, there are many sorts of reasons why this may be so. For example, 
inflicting suffering can interfere with your victim’s autonomy: her power to 
live the life that she values, to the best of her abilities. It may also express 
disrespect for your victim, or some other vicious attitude or trait. However, 
                                                     
3 It may be that not every pain is intrinsically bad. Some pains may be essential components 
of valued or valuable accomplishments or experiences. Possible examples include certain 
athletic achievements or even masochistic sex. It is arguable that such pains are not be bad at 
all. Other pains may not be bad because they are imperceptibly mild. Because my claim is 
about the typical significance of pain and suffering, it is compatible with these possibilities. 
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compare two ways of disrespectfully interfering with someone’s agency. On 
the one hand, you could repeatedly and obnoxiously distract her. On the 
other, you could inflict intense and prolonged pain on her. The second 
possible action seems worse, even holding fixed the degree of disrespect and 
interference. Indeed, if forced to choose between these two actions, it would 
be wrong to perform the second. The most natural explanation of this fact is 
that the way that suffering feels is a typically sufficient explanation of the 
wrongness of inflicting it.  
Our imagined stray dog can also suffer. In light of this, the explanation 
just suggested is also a very plausible explanation of why it would be wrong to 
shock the stray dog: doing so would make it suffer terribly. But there is 
nothing special about this case. Rather, the explanation just proposed 
supports a general principle: it is typically wrong to make animals suffer. 
Notice that this principle and the explanation that I used to defend it are 
distinct: it is possible for someone to reject my explanation but accept the 
principle for some other reason. 
Both the principle and the explanation I use to defend it are 
compatible with the plausible view that it is typically worse to inflict similarly 
severe suffering on an adult human rather than an animal. This could be 
explained, for example, by the significance of disrespecting or interfering with 
autonomous agency, which few (if any) animals possess to a significant 
degree.   
One might object that my explanation for the wrongness of inflicting 
suffering on a human fails, because it ignores the explanatory role of moral 
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status. For example, it might be claimed that it is wrong to make a human 
suffer because of what their suffering is like, together with humans’ distinctive 
moral status. Animals, it might be insisted, lack moral status (or have some 
sort of second-class moral status), and so the badness of their suffering cannot 
render wrongful an action that makes them suffer (see (Cohen 1986) for 
something like this idea).  
This objection should be rejected for two reasons.4 The first reason is 
intuitive. It is very plausible that it would be wrong to shock the dog, and this 
objection threatens to deprive us of the most natural explanation of that 
wrongness. The second reason is theoretical: the notion of moral status is 
associated with at least two different ideas. Once these ideas are 
distinguished, the objection fails.  
The first idea associated with moral status is that moral status is the 
bundle of ethical powers and protections characteristically possessed by adult 
humans. The second idea is that moral status grounds the directionality of 
duties. For example, if I have a duty to care for your treasured vase, it is a duty 
to you, not to the vase. By contrast, I have a duty to my son to care for him. So 
my son, but not the vase, has moral status in the directionality sense.5  
While I owe special duties to my two-year-old son, he lacks many of 
the ethical powers and protections that are characteristic of human adults. 
For example, it is often wrong to paternalistically make decisions for adult 
                                                     
4 For related skepticism about the usefulness of ‘moral status’ talk, see (Zamir 2007, Ch. 2). 
5 A helpful introduction to debates about moral status (Jaworska and Tannenbaum 2013) dubs 
these two ideas ‘full moral status’ and ‘moral status’ respectively.   
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humans: we should rather respect their decision-making about their own 
lives. By contrast, I have a moral duty to my son to be paternalistic towards 
him.  
If this is correct, the objection from moral status fails. The two ideas 
associated with moral status come apart: my son possesses the second but not 
the first. Further, the fact that we have duties to children to refrain from 
making them suffer shows that the explanation of the wrongness of inflicting 
suffering does not require that the victim have the sort of moral status 
characteristic of adult humans. Does the wrongness of inflicting suffering 
require the second (directedness) notion of moral status? I’m not sure. Recall 
the dog-torturing case. Do we have a duty to the dog not to make it suffer 
horribly? I am much less sure about this question that I am that it would be 
wrong to torture the dog, because of how it would feel for the dog to suffer. 
In light of this, I conclude: either we have duties to animals not to make them 
suffer, or the badness of their suffering can explain the wrongness of inflicting 
it, even absent such directed duties.    
This section has argued that it is wrong to make animals suffer. This 
followed from my underlying explanatory thesis: that what it is like to 
experience suffering constitutes a sufficient explanation of the wrongness of 
inflicting suffering. This explanation (perhaps amended to include reference 
to directedness moral status) appears plausible, and reflects the ethically 
significant similarities between humans and animals, without ignoring the 
ethically significant differences.    
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2.  The wrongness of killing animals 
In this section, I focus on the ethical significance of killing. As in the previous 
section, I begin by identifying a typically sufficient condition, this time for the 
wrongness of killing. This principle entails that it is typically wrong to kill 
animals. The wrongness of painlessly killing an animal is less obvious to many 
people than the wrongness of making it suffer. In light of this, I complement 
my primary argument by showing that it is difficult to coherently deny that it 
is wrong to kill animals while accepting the wrongness of inflicting animal 
suffering.  
My foil in this section is the ethical omnivore who suggests that it is 
okay to use animal products that are produced without inflicting suffering.6 
Because ethical omnivorism accepts the wrongness of inflicting suffering, it is 
itself a radical view, condemning most forms of contemporary animal 
agriculture. For example, it denounces the factory farms that provide animals 
with lives of nearly unmitigated suffering, and the especially egregious 
cruelties meted out to veal calves and the geese used to produce pâté.  
The fundamental disagreement between the ethical omnivore and the 
modest ethical vegan concerns the ethics of painlessly killing an animal. A 
clear case shows that the omnivore’s position is at least uncomfortable. 
Suppose that I caught a healthy stray kitten, took it home, and then killed it 
by adding a fast-acting and painless poison to its meal. I take it that this would 
                                                     
6 Compare (Pollan 2006, Ch. 17). This view has received significant critical attention. See 
(McMahan 2008), (DeGrazia 2009, 160-164), (Harman 2011), and (Norcross 2012) for 
alternatives to my reply.  
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be wrong. Suppose that the omnivore disagrees. The right way to adjudicate 
this dispute is to seek a general explanation of the wrongness of killing.  
The ethics of killing is a complex and controversial matter (see 
McMahan 2002 for a detailed discussion of many of the complexities). 
However, as with the wrongness of inflicting suffering, we can identify several 
typically sufficient explanations for the wrongness of killing an adult human. 
First, killing typically interferes dramatically with the victim’s autonomy. 
Second, nonconsensual killing is also inconsistent with appropriate respect for 
the victim’s autonomy: it alters his life – by ending it – without his consent. I 
will assume here that animals do not have autonomous plans, and thus that 
killing them is not objectionable in these ways.  
There is another important reason why killing a human being is 
wrong: killing typically deprives the victim of a valuable future.7 That is, killing 
someone deprives them of valuable experiences, activities, relationships, (etc.) 
that they would otherwise have had. The significance of this explanation is 
made especially vivid by considering cases of life-extending killings (Lippert-
Rasmussen 2001). For example, imagine a drug that, when injected, damages 
one’s heart such that one dies quickly and painlessly a year later. Ordinarily, 
my intentionally giving you such a drug would be wrongful killing. However, 
suppose that this drug is also the only antidote to a poison that you have just 
                                                     
7 Compare (Marquis 1989). Marquis suggests that this is the ‘primary’ thing that makes killing 
a person wrong. Because the autonomy-based considerations also strike me as important, I 
reject this stronger claim. For the underlying idea that the badness of one’s death is 
constituted by that death’s depriving one of a valuable future, see Nagel 1979.    
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accidentally ingested, which will kill you within the hour unless treated. 
Suppose finally that I give you the drug while you are unconscious from the 
poison, and sure enough, it kills you a year later. This is not a case of wrongful 
killing. Indeed, I am presumably ethically required to give you the drug in 
these circumstances, if I can. The crucial difference between this case and the 
ordinary case is that in the ordinary case, injecting the drug deprives you of 
your future, while in this case, it extends that future. The contrasting value of 
these possible futures provide a plausible explanation for why it is wrong to 
give the drug in the former case, and right to do so in the latter. This 
explanation entails that the fact that a killing deprives the victim of a valuable 
future is typically sufficient to explain why the killing is wrong. 
It is plausible that the futures of animals can be objectively good (or 
bad) for them to have. Valuable features of animal lives are not hard to sketch. 
Animals seem capable of pleasures as well as pains, and it is good to have a 
pleasant life; pack animals have better lives if they have companions, etc.
 
Consider a range of things that one might intentionally do to an animal: 
raising it in isolation, painlessly amputating a healthy limb, or rearing it on a 
diet lacking essential nutrients. These sorts of acts seem wrong. A natural 
explanation is that they are wrong because they deprive the animal of aspects 
of a valuable future such as companionship, the ability to function physically, 
and the ability to have a pleasant life.  
I have just suggested that animals can have valuable futures. And I 
argued above that one typically sufficient explanation for the wrongness of 
killing is that it deprives the victim of a valuable future. Because this is a 
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typically sufficient condition, it applies (absent defeating conditions) to 
killing anything that has a valuable future. For example, it smoothly explains 
why it would be wrong to kill the stray kitten in the example introduced 
above: given that the kitten is healthy, killing it almost certainly deprives it of 
a valuable future. But there is nothing special about the kitten in this example. 
So the explanation also entails a general ethical principle: that it is typically 
wrong to kill animals.   
The explanation that supports this principle also provides plausible 
guidance concerning when it would be okay to kill an animal. For it suggests 
that (other things being equal) it is permissible to kill an animal if its future 
will on balance be bad for it to have. For example, it suggests that it would be 
a mercy, and not wrong, to painlessly kill a cat that is suffering from an 
agonizing and incurable disease. This is the sort of case where we would 
rightly say that the animal’s continued life was a fate worse than death. 
As with the argument against inflicting suffering on animals, it is 
possible to resist my argument for the wrongness of killing animals by 
objecting that the explanation that I offer is incomplete. One initially 
plausible objection here claims that in order for an entity’s death to be bad for 
it, that entity must value its future. With this idea in hand, it could be 
suggested that many animals cannot value their futures (or at least: not in as 
rich of a way as humans), and hence that their deaths are not bad.8  
                                                     
8 See (Tooley 1972) for the closely related idea that the capacity to care about one’s continued 
existence is required for the right to life.  
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 This objection fails because it can be wrong to deprive a person of a 
valuable future, even if they do not value it (compare (Marquis 1989, 195-6)). 
Suppose that Penelope has temporarily fallen into deep depression: she 
cannot see the point of anything, except perhaps of dying to end the 
pointlessness. However, in a few weeks this condition will lift, and she will go 
on to have a long, rich, and fulfilling life. In this circumstance, Penelope has a 
valuable future, although her depression prevents her from valuing it. 
Evidently, killing Penelope now would be very wrong, even if she wanted you 
to do so.  
Nor does the value of an activity for a person depend on their 
eventually valuing it, or being able to value it. We are all familiar with cases 
of people who (sadly) never realize how good a relationship or activity is for 
them. And some such people may be psychologically incapable of recognizing 
such value due to some prejudice or trauma. This sort of blindness typically 
makes a person’s life worse, but it need not erase the goodness for him of the 
underlying relationship or activity. If animals are incapable of valuing, this 
entails at most that they are in a situation analogous to that of such people. 
We can act wrongly by depriving people of such unappreciated goods: you 
cannot vindicate theft or discrimination by convincing the victims that they 
do not value what they lack. This suggests that it can be wrong to deprive a 
creature of goods even if they do not or cannot value them. And with this the 
objection collapses.  
This argument for the wrongness of killing animals was independent 
of my case for the wrongness of making them suffer. However, it is also 
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difficult to coherently accept that it is wrong to make animals suffer, while 
denying that it is wrong to kill them. The difficulty can be dramatized by an 
example.  
Suppose that one could make a commercially or artistically successful 
video that in part would require performing a painful and unnecessary 
medical operation on a cow. If we grant that it is typically wrong to make the 
cow suffer, it is implausible that the commercial or artistic merits of the video 
outweigh the suffering, and thereby justify performing the operation. So 
performing the operation here would be wrong. But suppose that performing 
the same painful operation on a second cow would save that cow’s life. Here, 
performing the operation is clearly permissible – indeed, very nice – if the cow 
would go on to have a long and worthwhile life after the operation. This pair 
of cases makes it very difficult to accept that it is wrong to inflict suffering on 
animals, while denying that it is wrong to kill them. For preserving the life of 
the cow – and hence its valuable future – is enough in the second case to 
ethically justify inflicting otherwise wrongful suffering.  
This directly refutes the strong view that animal suffering matters but 
animal death does not: the strong view implausibly entails that it would be 
wrong to perform the life-extending operation. On the remaining possible 
view, the valuable future of an animal does not make it wrong to kill the 
animal, but it can somehow justify inflicting otherwise wrongful suffering on 
the animal. This view is deeply puzzling: it threatens to entail, for example, 
that it is okay for me to perform the painful operation, and then decide to 
slaughter the cow.   
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The account I have offered in this section provides a better explanation 
of why the second (medically required) cow operation is permissible: in this 
case one inflicts life-extending suffering. Inflicting life-extending suffering can 
be permissible for the same reason as life-extending killing: because the value 
of an animal’s future plays a uniform role in determining which ways of 
treating that animal are right and wrong.   
In this section, I noted that killing a person or an animal typically 
deprives them of a valuable future. I argued that this is a typically sufficient 
explanation of why a killing is wrong. The upshot is that it is typically wrong 
to kill animals. Finally, I argued that this thesis garners additional support 
from cases where we inflict suffering on animals as a necessary means to 
provide them with better lives. 
 
3.  Complicity with animal suffering and death 
The arguments of the previous two sections entail that it is typically wrong to 
kill or inflict suffering on animals. While crucial to my case for veganism, 
these arguments do not settle the issue. This is because of a central fact about 
contemporary life: the typical omnivore need not ever see a live cow or pig or 
chicken, let alone kill or inflict suffering on one. This fact forms the basis for 
an important objection to Modest Ethical Veganism. In this section, I develop 
the strongest form of this objection, and then answer it in two stages. First, I 
argue that the institutions responsible for producing our animal products act 
wrongly. Second, I argue that veganism is typically required as a response to 
the wrongful behavior of those institutions.  
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 Consider a preliminary objection: by the time you order a chicken 
dinner, the chicken it is made from is already dead. Ordering the meal doesn’t 
kill the chicken, and ordering a vegan burger instead won’t bring the chicken 
back. This objection invites a very tempting reply: what matters ethically is 
not (just) whether you yourself actively inflict animal suffering or death, but 
whether your behavior tends to makes a difference to the amount of animal 
suffering or death. Ordering the chicken dinner – while not harming the 
chicken you eat – might tend to lead to another chicken being bred, made to 
suffer terribly, and then killed.  
Your ordering the chicken dinner would tend to make a difference to 
the amount of animal suffering if the market for chicken were a perfectly 
efficient classical market in the following sense: every chicken dinner 
purchased increased the aggregate demand for chicken slightly; this increase 
in demand would slightly increase the market price for chicken, and this in 
turn would tend to produce a slight increase in the supply of chicken. Given 
how chickens are raised, increasing the supply of chicken involves increasing 
the amount of chicken suffering and death.  
This puts me in a position to introduce a stronger version of the 
objection to Modest Ethical Veganism:  
Inefficacy even if it is wrong to inflict animal suffering and death, it is 
not typically wrong to use animal products, because doing so 
does not tend to make any difference to the amount of 
animal suffering and death.
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Inefficacy combines an empirical claim with an ethical thesis. The empirical 
claim is that using animal products does not tend to make any difference to 
the amount of animal suffering and death. The ethical thesis is that veganism 
could only be ethically required if it made such a difference. 
 The empirical claim could be defended by rejecting the hypothesis 
that the actual market for chicken is relevantly similar to a perfectly efficient 
market. According to the objector, Food industry supply chains are so 
complex, and waste and inefficiency so rampant, that my decision to buy a 
chicken dinner (or other animal products) tends to have no effect at all on the 
rate of animal suffering and death. This empirical hypothesis has been 
challenged.9 But I will not pursue that challenge here.   
 The idea that becoming vegan will tend to make no difference to 
animal welfare is discouraging, but I will argue that it does not undercut 
Modest Ethical Veganism. This is because the ethical thesis underlying 
Inefficacy should be rejected, as I now argue.  
  
One initial reason for skepticism about this ethical thesis is that there 
are plausible ethical principles that require action even in cases where one 
                                                     
9 This challenge has been pressed by (Singer 1980, 335-6). Singer argues for the hypothesis 
that our consumption has a very small chance of making a difference to animal welfare, but if 
we do make a difference, that difference will be correspondingly enormous. Singer concludes 
that we ought to be vegetarian for that reason. (Norcross 2004, 232-3) and especially (Kagan 
2011) develop Singer’s idea further. See (Budolfson ms-a) for an important challenge to the 
Singer-style argument.        
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does not make such a difference. For example, consider the duty of fair play 
(e.g. Klosko 2004): this duty requires that one not benefit from successful 
cooperative institutions without making a fair contribution to them (i.e., that 
I not freeride). For example, suppose that there is a public bus in my town, 
which survives by charging its riders a fair price to ride. Because the bus uses 
the honor system, I can easily ride without paying, if I choose. Suppose finally 
that the cooperative benefits provided by the bus are not threatened by my 
failing to pay: there are enough paying riders that the bus system will persist 
whether or not I pay. In this case, my freeriding does not harm anyone, and 
yet it still seems wrong. This example only gives us reason to be suspicious of 
Inefficacy.10 I now argue that the suspicion is warranted: we can be required 
to be vegan even if doing so will make no difference to the amount of animal 
suffering and death.  
I begin by evaluating the institutions most directly involved in raising 
and slaughtering animals for use in making animal products: the farms, 
animal factories, feedlots and slaughterhouses. To be concise, I will call these 
the animal product industry. This industry inflicts extraordinary amounts of 
suffering, and then very early death, to the billions of animals it raises (see 
                                                     
10 One important way to defend the ethical thesis underlying Inefficacy would be to appeal to 
an influential general ethical theory: act-consequentialism. This is the thesis that the rightness 
of an act is determined purely by the aggregate consequences of that act (in its most familiar 
form, how much net happiness will follow from it, compared to other options). If true, act-
consequentialism would vindicate the ethical thesis underlying Inefficacy. I take act-
consequentialism to be false, but I cannot argue adequately for that claim here.  
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Mason and Singer 1990 for a sketch of some of the literally gory details).11 My 
argument for the wrongness of killing animals and making them suffer 
constitutes a strong case that the animal product industry thereby act 
wrongly.  
As I have noted, however, the principles I defend can be defeated by 
sufficiently weighty competing ethical considerations. Can we find such 
considerations to ethically vindicate the industry that raises and slaughters 
animals for our use? We cannot. The most obvious good effects of this 
industry are the economic benefits to the industry itself, and the enjoyments 
and meanings that consumers take from using the resulting products. The 
appeal to these good effects fails for three reasons.  
First, economic benefits are rarely the sort of thing that can justify 
otherwise wrongful acts. For example, suppose that I could make a good living 
torturing kittens and selling videos of the torture on the internet. The fact that 
it would make me money would not justify my actions.  
Second, there is a vast array of enjoyable vegan food that most current 
omnivores could learn to enjoy: while veganism surely requires sacrificing 
some gustatory enjoyment, it is certainly compatible with a richer gustatory 
life than most omnivores currently experience. This leaves the value of the 
                                                     
11 We often hold institutions responsible for acts. For example, U.S. law held BP responsible 
for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. However, some philosophers believe that only individuals 
can act or be morally responsible. If you believe this, feel free to read my talk of institutions 
with wrongful plans as shorthand for very complex facts about large collections of individuals 
with wrongful plans. 
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cultural meanings that many people attach to food as a significant positive 
effect. But these meanings surely cannot justify inflicting suffering and death 
on billions of animal every year. The third reason that the appeal to the good 
effects of contemporary animal agriculture fails is that such agriculture has 
significant negative effects on humans that must also be weighted in the 
balance.  
Consider four points. First, it typically requires far more arable land 
and water to produce a calorie of meat than to produce a calorie of plant-
based food.12 Animal agriculture thus puts pressure on vulnerable cropland 
and water resources. Second, the economic incentives facing animal 
agriculture have led to increasingly industrialized farming practices. This has 
increased the amount of environmentally toxic byproducts generated by 
farming. This in turn both further damages land and water systems and 
directly threatens human health (Walker et. al. 2005). Third, animal 
agriculture is a significant contributor to the catastrophic threat of global 
warming.13  Finally, the overconsumption of animal products is a central 
contributor to the unhealthiness of the majority of North American diets, 
                                                     
12 This is only true in the general case; for example, some land is too poor to viably grow plant 
crops, but can support grazing animals, so environmental consideration may support eating 
meat grown on such land. For a helpful discussion of this issue, see (Fairlie 2010, Ch. 3). 
13 Estimates of the climate impact of animal agriculture range wildly, from between a 
twentieth and a half of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions For competing estimates 
of the climate effects of animal agriculture, see (Goodland and Anhang 2009), (Fairlie 2010, 
Ch. 13),  and (United Nations Food and Agriculture Association, 2014).  
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which include too many calories, too much saturated fat, and too few 
vegetables and whole grains (Walker et. al 2005). Vegan diets tend not to have 
these features. It is thus arguable that the overall impact of the animal product 
industry on human health is very negative.14 
For these reasons, it is very far from clear that the net effect of 
contemporary animal agriculture on humans is positive.15 It is thus 
implausible that these effects suffice to defeat the application of the principles 
I defended in the previous two sections. Because the institutions that produce 
our animal products are responsible for the suffering and death of many 
billions of animals every year, the principles I have defended thus entail that 
the institutions most directly responsible for animal suffering and death are 
thereby guilty of massive and systematic wrongdoing.   
I now argue that veganism is required because consumption of animal 
products puts us into ethically objectionable relations to these institutions. 
The key idea is that one should not aim to benefit from wrongdoing.16 Let me 
illustrate this idea with a case. Suppose that Alice has decided to buy a house, 
and (having small children) desires to live in a quiet neighborhood near an 
                                                     
14 To be clear, current nutritional science does not find significant health differences between 
people with ‘plant-based’ omnivorous diets, and those with vegetarian or vegan diets (Dwyer 
2013, 318-320). The impact of animal products on health that I identify is a function of actual, 
rather than ideal, patterns of omnivorous eating.  
15 For arguments for vegetarianism that appeal to some of the considerations just mentioned, 
see (Singer 2002, 165-9) and (Rachels 2011, §3.) 
16 (DeGrazia 2009, 157-9) argues for a related idea. Other philosophers (e.g. Rachels 1997) 
content themselves with the thought that ideas in this neighborhood are deeply plausible.   
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elementary school. It turns out that a certain realtor in her town consistently 
has the best stock of such houses on offer. There is only one catch: this realtor 
is a racist, who uses his business to promote the racial homogeneity of ‘nice’ 
neighborhoods. He does this by showing houses in these neighborhoods only 
to members of Alice’s race. If there are other realtors with reasonable houses 
on offer, it would be wrong for Alice to work with the racist realtor. This seems 
true even if Alice’s doing so will make no difference to the racial make-up of 
the relevant neighborhoods or to the realtor’s profits (for example, because 
Alice can foresee that someone else of her race will happily make use of the 
realtor’s services in her place).  
 The wrongness of working with the realtor, even in such 
circumstances, appears best explained as follows. The realtor has a wrongful 
plan: to promote racial homogeneity by selling desirable homes in a 
discriminatory way. By using his services to buy a home, Alice would be 
seeking to benefit by cooperating with that plan. And it is wrong to do that. 
This suggests that it is typically wrong to seek to benefit by cooperating with 
wrongful plans. 
 We can identify a more specific and more stringent principle, 
however. Suppose that the only local grocer sells two sorts of products: 
ethically produced food, and nutritional supplements that she makes by 
painfully extracting bone marrow and tissue from the slaves that she keeps in 
the basement. If refusing to buy the grocer’s food would lead you to starve, it 
might be too demanding to insist that one not cooperate with the grocer at 
all. However, this does not give you carte blanche to buy and enjoy the 
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supplements. The right way to explain this is that there is a distinctively 
wrongful part of the grocer’s plan: making and selling the supplements. And 
even if we have no acceptable way to avoid cooperating with her plan overall, 
we can and ought to avoid cooperating with its distinctively wrongful part.  
These cases illustrate the principle that I endorse:  
 
Anti-Complicity  It is typically wrong to aim to benefit by cooperating 
with the wrongful elements of others’ plans  
 
My talk of ‘plans’ here should not be taken to apply only to official corporate 
plans, or to patterns of explicit reasoning; rather it should include the pattern 
of goals that explain an individual’s or institution’s behavior. For example, 
suppose that NGO X’s official organizational mission is to dig wells in sub-
Saharan Africa, but X’s executives in fact systematically use X to funnel donor 
funds to their Swiss bank accounts. As I am thinking about plans, NGO X’s 
actual plan in this case centrally involves defrauding donors.   
Anti-Complicity explains why it is wrong to buy supplements from the 
grocer, but okay to buy vegetables from her (at least if you lack other adequate 
sources of food). Buying the vegetables does not cooperate with the wrongful 
part of her plan. Similarly, Anti-Complicity can explain why it is okay to buy 
vegetables at your local grocery store, despite the fact that this store almost 
certainly sells animal products, and thereby has a wrongful plan. However, as 
in the slave-torturing grocer example, you do not typically cooperate with the 
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wrongful part of your grocery store’s wrongful plan by purchasing their 
vegetables.  
Anti-Complicity similarly explains why it is wrong to work with the 
racist realtor: buying a house from the realtor just is cooperating with the 
wrongful part of his plan. Finally, Anti-Complicity also explains why Inefficacy 
is false, because it does not require that your use of animal products makes a 
difference to the amount of animal suffering in the world. This aspect of Anti-
Complicity is plausible: in the example just given, it is wrong to buy the 
supplements from the grocer even if doing so did not lead to more suffering 
for the grocer’s slaves.   
 I take these points to show that Anti-Complicity has formidable 
explanatory power. One might worry that this principle is nonetheless 
objectionable, because it is too demanding. Consider for example the 
hypothesis that virtually every product that we need in order to live our lives 
is produced as part of a plan that aims to benefit from exploitative labor 
practices, or wrongful environmental degradation, or some other wrongful 
act. Given this hypothesis, it might seem that Anti-Complicity tells us that 
whatever we do is wrong.  
There are three important points to make about this worry. First, the 
suggested hypothesis is boldly pessimistic, and we should not assume that it 
would survive careful scrutiny. Second, the hypothesis is naturally read as one 
in which our lives are maintained only at ethically objectionable cost to 
others. Our ethical obligations should be very demanding when applied to 
such cases. Compare: a slaveholder should typically free his slaves, and 
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compensate them for the exploitation he has inflicted on them, even if doing 
so requires sacrificing the things he most cares about. Third, the 
demandingness of Anti-Complicity should not be overstated. Like all of the 
principles I have defended in this paper, this principle is explicitly defeasible. 
This means that it is compatible with there being cases in which competing 
ethical considerations make cooperation with wrongful plans permissible, or 
even required. Consider the grocer example again: if my child had a rare 
medical condition that was devastating if untreated, and the condition could 
only be treated by using the grocer’s noxiously produced supplements, it 
might be permissible to buy the supplements in order to treat her.    
My defense of Anti-Complicity puts me in a position to complete my 
case for Modest Ethical Veganism. My preceding arguments entail that the 
institutions that make our animal products have a wrongful plan: they aim to 
profit financially by selling products made in a way that involves wrongful 
animal suffering and death. By purchasing the resulting products, you would 
be seeking to benefit by cooperating with this plan. Anti-Complicity entails 
that such cooperation is typically wrongful. And – unlike in the medical 
condition case just discussed – the choice to be vegan does not typically 
impose large morally significant costs.  
 
4.  What the argument implies 
This paper has argued for  
 
Modest Ethical Veganism It is typically wrong to use animal products 
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Where animal products means products made from or by mammals, and the 
birds that are familiar sources of meat (chickens, turkeys, ducks, etc.). It may 
be helpful to review the overall structure of my argument for this thesis:  
1. It is wrong to inflict animal suffering and death, unless there are strong 
competing ethical considerations (§§1-2) 
2. The animal product industry systematically inflicts massive suffering 
and death on animals 
3. There are no competing ethical considerations that justify the animal 
death and suffering inflicted by the animal product industry (§3) 
4. The animal product industry systematically engages in massive 
wrongdoing: It has a wrongful plan (from 1-3) 
5. In the typical case, using animal products involves seeking to benefit 
from cooperating with the animal product industry’s plan (§3) 
6. It is wrong to seek to benefit by cooperating with others’ wrongful 
plans, absent competing ethical considerations (§3) 
7. In the typical case, there are no competing ethical considerations that 
justify cooperating with these institutions   
C.  In the typical case, it is wrong to use animal products (from 4-7)   
This summary of the argument may seem overly pedantic. However, it is 
intended to be useful. The argument makes explicit each of the claims that 
together support my conclusion. And the argument is valid: if the premises of 
the argument are true, then the conclusion must be true. This means that 
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anyone wishing to reasonably reject my conclusion must explain which 
premise they wish to reject, and how my argument for that premise is flawed.17  
I conclude the paper by exploring the implications of this argument. 
In order to clarify its significance, I focus on spelling out its limitations. I first 
explain that I leave open how far across the animal kingdom my argument 
extends. I then explain the way that Modest Ethical Veganism is compatible 
with the possibility of ethically acceptable animal farming practices. Finally, I 
explore some consequences of the fact that this thesis allows for exceptions, 
and discuss its application to certain hard cases.  
Before explaining these limitations, it is important to emphasize that 
they limit the implications of this argument. My argument does not claim to 
illuminate the only reason to be vegan. Consider just one example: as I noted 
in §3, the animal product industry also contributes significantly to global 
warming and environmental degradation more broadly. Some such 
contributions may constitute wrongful indifference to human and animal 
well-being. This in turn could underwrite a second argument that it is wrong 
to be complicit with this industry. Such an argument, if sound, might have 
interestingly different scope and limitations. So a vegan could accept my 
argument, but take veganism to be required for other reasons, in cases where 
my argument does not apply.  
                                                     
17 For discussion of the attempt to reject the conclusion of this sort of argument without 
rejecting its premises see (McPherson forthcoming). For related methodological discussion, 
see (McPherson published online). 
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Note first that my argument rests crucially on the fact that animals 
like cats, dogs, cows, pigs, sheep, deer, goats, rabbits, geese, ducks, turkeys 
and chickens can suffer.18 It is a hard question how far across the animal 
kingdom this capacity is distributed. The central question is: what sort of 
brain architecture is needed to underwrite the possibility of suffering, and 
how widely distributed is that architecture? If we ordered all known animals 
by the complexity of their nervous systems, humans would be at one end; at 
the other end are animals like oysters (which lack a brain) and sponges (which 
entirely lack a nervous system). I am certain that these latter animals cannot 
suffer.19  
As I emphasized in the introduction, my argument thus falls short of 
vindicating veganism, if that is strictly understood to ban use of any animal 
products.20 This paper does not seriously address where on that spectrum the 
capacity to suffer arises. For example, fish are a salient hard case. However, I 
will suggest that in the absence of a convincing account of the biological basis 
for the capacity to suffer, we should be cautious in what we are willing to eat. 
                                                     
18 Vegans are sometimes challenged to explain how they justify taking the life of plants. While 
plants can have better or worse lives, they cannot suffer. And it is implausible that their lives 
are ethically significant in anything like the way the life of a being that can feel is.  
19 (Armstrong and Botzler 2009, Part Two) provides a helpful introduction to questions about 
animal capacities.  
20 The animal kingdom is an elegant and salient place to mark the boundary of the ethically 
edible, but I take ethical veganism to require a more serious vindication than this. Compare 
Cox 2010, which suggests that vegans ought to be able to eat oysters.  
McPherson  Why I am a Vegan 29 
 
Merely doubting whether an animal can suffer is not an appropriate ground 
for privileging one’s appetite over its possible suffering. 
Note next that nothing in my argument rules out animal farming per 
se. It is possible to imagine farming animals in a way that does not involve 
shortening their lives or making them suffer. My view does not suggest any 
objection to using milk, wool, etc. that was produced on such farms. Again, 
some vegans take it to be wrong to use animals in any way. This is another 
respect in which my veganism is modest.  
This limitation has little practical import, however. This is because 
almost all actual animal farming involves killing animals or making them 
suffer. The reasons lie in the interaction between biology and economics. 
Consider a single example among many: even the most humane dairy farm 
will typically produce as many male calves as female, and almost no such farm 
will support all of the (largely economically useless) males through their 
natural lives. Rather, in almost every case, they will be raised for meat. That 
means that almost any economically viable dairy farming operation 
participates in the raising of cows to be killed and eaten, a practice that I have 
argued in §3 is typically wrong.  
This sort of point explains why I take my argument to support a vegan 
lifestyle, as opposed to a vegetarian lifestyle that permits use of dairy products 
(for example), but not animal flesh. Even in the best realistic case, using dairy 
products involves supporting institutions whose practices include the 
systematic wrongful treatment of male cattle. Using such products is thus 
typically wrong. 
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The final limitation to my argument that I want to explore is that my 
argument for the wrongness of eating animal products allows for exceptions. 
At least three sorts of exceptions are possible. First, there are possible cases 
(like those just mentioned above) of animal products that are made without 
inflicting suffering or death. Second, there are cases where the burdens of 
refraining from using animal products would be exceptionally high.21  
What is the significance of this second possibility? One the one hand, 
my arguments do not imply that animal death or suffering is typically as 
ethically significant as human death, or similarly intense human suffering. In 
fact, in §§2-3 I emphasized that there are a range of factors that typically 
                                                     
21 Another possibility is that certain forms of animal agriculture might inflict suffering and 
death on animals, but also have good effects that outweigh the ethical significance of that 
suffering and death. These effects include overall animal well-being, as well as a range of other 
values, including agricultural sustainability, environmental sustainability, and fostering 
meaningful local economies. Consider a possible example. Traditional or organic farming tend 
to involve much less animal suffering than factory farming. Suppose (a) that such farms could 
only be economically viable if they involve some killing and inflicting suffering on animals, and 
(b) supporting such farms had a good chance of bringing about a future in which animals were 
overall much better off than they currently are, and the deleterious environmental effects of 
agriculture were mitigated. It might be argued that it is okay or even required to support such 
farms. I take there to be little reason to believe that supporting such farms has a significantly 
better chance of promoting the relevant values than being vegan does. In light of this, I consider 
such a possibility largely irrelevant to our ethical choices.   
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contribute to the wrongness of killing humans or making them suffer that are 
not present in most animals.  
I take these considerations to suggest that the most central and 
pressing human interests typically take ethical priority over non-human 
animal welfare. For example, my conclusion is compatible with it being 
permissible or even required to harm or kill an animal if doing so is needed to 
prevent suffering or death to a human being. This may suggest that some 
lethal medical research using animals can be ethically justified, if we have 
good reason to believe that it will greatly benefit humans. (However, this 
weighty criterion suggests that much current medical research using animals 
is not justified.) Similarly, in various times and places, animal products have 
been an essential element of the only available adequate human diets. For 
example, for rural families in many parts of the world, having a cow – or even 
a handful of chickens – can offer crucial protection against certain forms of 
malnutrition. I suspect that these considerations are sufficient to justify 
exceptions to my argument. 
My argument for Modest Ethical Veganism thus allows for exceptions. 
But it bears emphasis that the burdens that I take to justify exceptions to 
veganism must be very weighty, as those just mentioned were. Here is an 
imperfect but reasonable heuristic: some circumstances would warrant 
torturing the stray dog imagined in §2, or killing the stray kitten imagined in 
§3. I contend that only equally dire circumstances would warrant ordering the 
sirloin steak for dinner. In light of this heuristic, consider what most of us 
would give up by becoming vegan. First, one gives up the aesthetic pleasure 
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and rich meaning involved in consuming animal foods. Second, one gives up 
the ability to participate fully in some culinary traditions, and food-centered 
social occasions. This also has the potential to decrease one’s social 
opportunities. Finally, given the marginal status of vegans in our society, one 
faces extra burdens of planning and inconvenience in feeding oneself. For 
those who are severely disadvantaged in other ways – by poverty and 
discrimination, for example – the additional sacrifices that veganism would 
require might constitute an intolerable additional burden. But for most of us, 
the costs of becoming vegan are far from weighty enough to justify 
omnivorism. After all, you wouldn’t torture a dog or kill a cat for these sorts 
of reasons, would you?22  
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